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 1 
Institutionalized Fact Finding at the WTO 
by DAVID COLLINS∗ 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This short article argues that the WTO should have a standing agency to conduct fact 
finding in order to correct evidentiary deficiencies in submissions by members to 
panels during dispute settlement.  This will compensate for both the incapacity to 
produce full disclosure on the part of developing nations and the unwillingness to do 
so from other members due to strategic reasons or purposes of confidentiality.  It is 
suggested that such an investigatory mandate could fit into the panels’ existing right 
to seek information or within the broad scope of powers granted tribunals in 
international law.  Separation between fact finding and decision-making achieved by a 
specialized fact finding body would insure judicial impartiality and promote 
legitimacy. 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent World Trade Organization (WTO) panel report on investigations relating 
to the softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the United States1 demonstrates 
that international trade disputes are increasingly turning upon conclusions drawn from 
a complex factual background and as a result the need for WTO panels to possess a 
complete evidentiary record has never been clearer.  As Matthias Oesch wrote of 
WTO dispute settlement in 2003: “…a wide investigative authority and the necessary 
technical and personnel means are prerequisites for a comprehensive a thorough panel 
examination of facts…”2 Despite this need, currently WTO panels cannot engage in 
de novo review of members’ factual submissions and while parties to WTO disputes 
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 STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Oxford U Press 2003) at 55. 
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are required to tender all evidence requested by the panels, they are often unable or 
unwilling to do so.  The problem could be alleviated by the implementation of a 
dedicated fact finding agency within the WTO to conduct investigations in order to 
clarify existing facts as well ascertain missing information helpful to the rendering of 
judgment.  Such an investigative body would not make recommendations or draw 
conclusions but instead gather the evidence requested by the panel at the behest of the 
parties or of the panel itself on its own motion (propio motu).  The fact finding body’s 
role would therefore in a sense be remedial; it would step in to address inadequacies 
in the evidence as submitted by the parties for the purpose of fully informed decision-
making.  The purpose of institutionalized fact finding is thus seen as supplemental to 
existing disclosure requirements or as a ‘last resort’ which would engender WTO 
proceedings, suffering from deficient evidence, with crucial fairness and legitimacy.  
This article will demonstrate the need for such an agency first by framing a fact 
finding mandate within the current evidentiary powers of panels under the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and by suggesting that a WTO fact finding 
body can fit within existing principles of international law which are applicable to the 
WTO.  This article will then discuss necessary limitations on such an agency’s role, 
evaluate associated benefits and detriments, and conclude with an outline of the form 
that the fact finding body would take.    
Before embarking on this analysis, a distinction must first be drawn between a 
WTO panel reviewing information already before it, where the panel is limited to an 
“objective assessment” of the facts as presented by the member states3, and obtaining 
new information to fill gaps in the evidentiary record.  The former, it is suggested, 
involves a direct challenge to the conclusions drawn by the authorities of the member 
                                                
3
 Article 11 WTO DSU.  A de novo standard which would give the panels complete freedom to come 
to different conclusions on evidence presented by authorities from within member states was rejected 
by the Appellate Body in EC Hormones WT/DS26/AB/R ¶117-118 (13 Feb 1998). 
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states, and the latter, which is the focus of this article, involves an evaluation of the 
fullness of the information tendered relative to what is needed for the panel properly 
to arrive upon its decision.  The distinction is admittedly a subtle one – questioning 
the facts themselves does cast into doubt theories drawn from them-- and may 
accordingly necessitate the establishment of a stricter standard of review, a reform 
which will not be discussed here and has been addressed by others. 4  For the purposes 
of this article reviewing conclusions and investigating into omission (which does not 
involve review per se) will be treated as separate fact finding concepts.   
 
II..  THE RIGHT TO SEEK INFORMATION 
It is necessary to begin with an examination of the current scope of WTO panels to 
obtain evidence lacking from party submissions.  In order to achieve a more complete 
picture of evidence, panels already have broad authority to seek information from the 
parties themselves and elsewhere, as provided in Article 13 of the DSU: 
 
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and 
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or 
advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a 
Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.  A Member 
should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for 
such information as the panel considers necessary and 
appropriate….   
 
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and 
may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the 
matter.  With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or 
other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may 
                                                
4
 For a detailed analysis of the standard of review see Oesch supra note 2; L. Hamilton US Anti 
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OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2003);  J. Pauwelyn Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute 
Settlement – Who Bears the Burden  1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 242 (1998) and S 
Zleptnig The Standard of Review in WTO Law EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2002 vol 6. 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/article/erpeiopxx/p0090.htm> (last accessed 9 December 2005). 
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request an advisory report in writing from an expert review 
group…. 
 
 
Panels are entitled to request information from the parties and to ask questions that 
panels deem relevant to an assessment of the issues, irrespective of whether the 
complaining party has already established a prima facie case.5  Article 13 has been 
viewed as establishing a duty to disclose information rather than a mere preference 
and members are expected to approach the DSU in good faith.6 Joost Pauwelyn has 
observed that the scope of the fact seeking power conferred under Article 13 is so 
broad that it may include the right to “force the parties to a dispute to submit certain 
information not yet on record”7 which identifies the legitimate concern that members 
may be unwilling to produce all the evidence that is requested.  Indeed, the 
importance of a broad right to seek information is illustrated by the failure of one of 
the parties to provide the evidence required for a properly informed legal 
determination.  When the DSU had been drafted it was assumed that the requisite 
facts would be brought to the attention of panels through the written and oral 
arguments of the Member nations.8  Unfortunately this does not always occur.9  There 
                                                
5
 J. WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
(Cameron May London 1999) at 543 referring to AB Report, Thailand – Anti Dumping Duties 
WT/DS122/AB/R ¶135 ( 5 April 2001). 
6
 AB Report Canada – Aircraft WT/DS70/AB/RW ¶187 (4 August 2000). 
7
 J. Paulweyn The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement 51 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW QUARTERLY 325 (2002) at 329.  Emphasis mine. 
8
 J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London, 1998) at 92. 
9
 Allegations of evidentiary shortcomings have been made by opposing parties recently in Softwood 
Lumber Investigations (supra note 1) and Panel Report - US Countervailing Duties on Certain 
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the nature of party’s claims (¶7.67-7.71).  The adequacy factual record presented by parties has also 
been questioned by GATT panels:  Brazil – Milk Powder, GATT doc.SCM/179 (12 April 1994) and 
US - Hot Rolled Lead GATT doc.DRS/la (14 October 1994), see G. Horlick and P. Clarke Standards 
for Panels Reviewing Anti-Dumping Determinations Under GATT and the WTO in G. Horlick ed. 
WTO AND NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Cameron and May London 2003) at 296. 
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is a tendency for governments to ignore panel requests for facts.10 Parties might be 
unwilling to provide information because of a duty of confidentiality to third parties 
or because they feel that the information is irrelevant and therefore could be 
prejudicial.  This is particularly problematic in commercial defence proceedings 
because business confidential information is often protected in domestic 
administrative proceedings.11 The scope of a Member’s responsibility to comply with 
disclosure requests from panels remains clouded.  For example, it is unclear as to 
whether the obligation to produce information extends to data in the possession of the 
member at the time of the request or whether it must also gather relevant information, 
which may possibly be the in possession of a private party.  It has been suggested that 
if it is reasonably within a Member’s power to obtain such information then it should 
do so.12  
The Appellate Body has urged that the integrity of the WTO dispute 
settlement process depends on the Panel’s ability to induce parties to a dispute to 
comply with their duty to provide necessary information and that the failure of a party 
to do so may lead to adverse inferences being drawn.13 Although panels have been 
hesitant to draw adverse inferences against parties that do not provide requested 
information that is within their possession, the Appellate Body has clarified that 
Panels have the authority to do so.14 A respondent’s decision not to tender evidence 
on a particular issue when the party has denied or refused to admit elements of the 
                                                
10
 J. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO:  Access to the DSB System:  Can the WTO Live Up to the Moniker 
‘World Trade Court’ 31 LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 739 (2000) at 762. 
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 E. VERMULST and  F. GRAAFSMA, WTO DISPUTES ANTI-DUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND SAFEGUARDS 
(Cameron May London 2002) at 52.  For additional commentary on the confidentiality of WTO DSB 
proceedings see D PALMETER and P MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Kluwer International London 2002) at 91-93 and A 
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Oxford U Press 2002) at 164. 
12
 Waincymer supra note 5 at 549. 
13
 AB Report, Canada Aircraft supra note 6 ¶204. 
14
 Indonesia Auto WT/DS54/R (23 July 1998).  For additional commentary on adverse inferences see 
Palmeter and Mavroidis supra note 11 at 118-120. 
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claim does not prevent a panel from seeking info on that issue.15 While an adverse 
inference may offer some assistance in arriving upon a determination of fact, 
independent verification of evidence through investigation would be infinitely more 
useful from the perspective of completeness and accuracy.  In addition to the 
unwillingness of member states to tender all necessary evidence, developing nation 
members may be incapable because of resource limitations to provide a complete 
factual record as requested.  Finally, efforts to obtain information by one member 
could be frustrated by another member. 
In recognition of the need to rectify such factual deficiencies, the Appellate 
Body stated that: “If … any party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a 
claim are, for any reason, not before the panel, then that party should ask the panel in 
that case to engage in additional fact-finding.”16 This statement suggests that the 
panel may be entitled to engage in investigation beyond that which is outlined in DSU 
Article 11 in order to resolve omissions in a party’s factual submissions.  Panels’ 
broad based authority to consult experts may support a wider interpretation of panel’s 
powers with respect to evidence collection.  Permanent groups of experts are already 
established to provide technical advice to WTO panels when needed under Article 24 
the Subsidy Agreement, Article 18.2 of the Customs Valuation Agreement and Article 
8 of the Textiles Agreement.  Given the above noted breadth of scope of the DSU, the 
need and possibly also the authority to allow a de novo fact finding function, as 
distinct from a de novo reviewing function, for the panels is apparent.  Less clear is 
the ability to extend this authority to permit the procurement of additional facts 
without a request from one of the parties – propio motu.  However, such power may 
fit into the even wider discretion available to tribunals in international law. 
                                                
15
 Panel Report - Canada Aircraft  WT/DS70/R ¶9.83 (14 April 1999). 
16
 India – Patents WT/DS50/AB/R ¶ 94. (19 December 1997). Emphasis mine. 
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III.  FACT FINDING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Third party fact finding is well-entrenched in international law and for this reason we 
should not be immediately disturbed by the extension of this power in the WTO 
arena.  Article 9 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
contemplated Commissions of Inquiry, the function of which was “to facilitate a 
solution of …disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and 
conscientious investigation.” Many modern treaties provide for the establishment of 
fact finding bodies.  For example, the 1982 United Nations (UN) Convention on the 
Law of the Sea makes provision for an inquiry whose findings of fact are in most 
cases to be considered final by the parties to the dispute.17 The European Economic 
Community Treaty grants authority to the Commission to investigate potential treaty 
violation (Art 85). Similarly, international organisations have frequently implemented 
fact finding bodies to facilitate their decision-making, such as the International Labor 
Organization which has created commissions of inquiry on several occasions to assess 
complaints relating to alleged violations of labor conventions.18 The UN Security 
Council deployed a fact finding mission in 1981 regarding the political unrest in the 
Seychelles.19 The UN Secretary General sent a fact finding team to look into the 
Iran/Iraq war in 1987.20 The UN General Assembly’s policy of fact finding was 
embodied in a1992 Resolution and Declaration which encouraged the use of such 
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 Annex VIII Special Arbitration Article 5(2). 
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 J. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Cambridge U Press, 1993) at 56.  Article 26 of 
the ILO Constitution provides for the establishment of fact finding inquiries. 
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 SC Res 496 (1981). 
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missions by UN organisations. This statement authorized the Security Council to 
conduct fact finding without the consent of the state in which they took place.21  
 Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of analogy to WTO dispute 
settlement, fact finding is not without precedent in the activities of international 
judicial bodies which have traditionally operated without the restrictive rules of 
evidence seen in municipal courts.  Indeed, as Mojtaba Kazari has observed: 
 
The liberalism of international law and the inherent flexibility 
of international procedure, too, naturally favour the authority 
of international tribunals to investigate, propio motu, the facts 
at issue.22  
 
 
Examples of judicial fact finding in international law are numerous.  It is extended to 
the European Court of Human Rights under article 40 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  Tribunals established under the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes have the authority to conduct investigations under 
Article 43 of the Convention.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has an express 
entitlement to conduct a site inspection to procure evidence under Article 44(2) of its 
Statute.  This authority also belonged to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ).23 Examples of fact finding in international law include 
the submission of questionnaires, pre-hearing conferences, on-site inspection, 
summoning witnesses, and judicial notice.24   
                                                
21
 GA Res 46/59 (1992) 31 ILM 235. 
22
 M. KAZARI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY OF EVIDENCE BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (Kluwer Law International, London, 1998) at 154. 
23Although the PCIJ rules had been silent on the issue of fact finding, authority was found in a 
technical regulation which provided for the payment of judge’s expenses while travelling on duty to 
examine locations concerned in the proceedings.  See M Hudson Visits By International Tribunals to 
Places Concerned in the Proceedings 31 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (1937). 
24
 See Kazari supra note 22 at 168-176.  Waincymer has suggested that WTO panels are already 
empowered to conduct site inspections supra note 5 at 544. 
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The prevalence of tribunals which have engaged in fact finding may suggest 
that the ability to do does not require authorization through statute or other 
incorporating instrument such as a tribunal’s rules of procedure but rather is inherent.  
It may be tempting to conclude that fact finding is an established general principle of 
law or a custom.  Like any international tribunal, the WTO panel has the implied 
jurisdiction once seized of a matter to “interpret the submissions of the parties” so as 
to “isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim.”25 The 
doctrine of implied powers requires that the implied power does not contradict the 
“essential nature of the organization” but enables it “to discharge the functions laid 
upon it” by its constituent instrument26 – in this case the DSU.  The procurement of 
facts is easily seen as an important aspect of the WTO’s purpose to adjudicate trade 
disputes.  Although the WTO must be viewed as part of public international law, the 
extent to which the fact finding feature, as well as other principles of international 
law, such as the doctrine of implied powers, may be extended to what is essentially a 
bi-lateral, self-contained regime is admittedly uncertain.  However, the statement in 
Article 3.2 of the DSU which specifies that WTO agreements must be interpreted “in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law” 
suggests that precedents in international law, such as those involving fact finding, 
may not only offer guidance when evaluating the powers of WTO DSB but may 
actually inform any extensions thereof. 27  In this regard it may also be significant that 
the WTO agreements do not explicitly mention that the panels do not have a fact 
finding mandate such that it cannot be asserted that WTO members have “contracted 
                                                
25
 Nuclear Test Case (ICJ) 1974 ICJ Rep 259-260 para 23 and J. Pauwelyn  The Role of Public 
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go (2001) 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 578 at 555.   
26
 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) Application to Intervene ICJ 
Reports 1990 at 3 at 41-42 per Shahabudeen (28 February 1990).  
27
 J. Pauwelyn The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go (2001) 95 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 at 578. 
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out” of the principles of international law or even that there is any indication of 
conflict between them in this area.   Potential limitations on the panel’s jurisdiction to 
conduct factual investigation will now be considered.  
 
IV.  LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL FACT FINDING 
Under a strict adversarial system, a fact finding role for judges in any tribunal raises 
concern that the impartiality and objectivity of their rulings will be compromised.  
This is reflected for example in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges which 
prohibits judges from actively participating in investigations.28 But as the foregoing 
section indicated, the WTO DSB should arguably be viewed in the light the 
inquisitive model of adjudication common to Civil Law systems such as Japan and 
Continental Europe and as such may possess a more proactive role characterized by 
increased emphasis on negotiation over litigation. 29 There is a further intuitive 
justification for a fact finding role on the part of any court of first instance, such as the 
WTO panels, even within an adversarial framework.  Leaving aside the use of the jury 
which persists in some justice systems, any trial level court must necessarily make 
determinations of the truth or validity of facts upon which legal claims are based just 
as an appellate court will make rulings of law.  But appellate judges do not merely 
take submissions on the law from the parties to the dispute and weigh them against 
each other; they conduct their own research by consulting textbooks, case law, and 
statutes to arrive upon their own conclusions, colored as they should be by the legal 
arguments presented by counsel.  Some, if not most of this legal research is conducted 
                                                
28
 A judge shall disqualify himself if he has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding.”28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1).  For further discussion of this topic see E. Sward 
Appellate Review of Judicial Fact Finding (1991-92) 40 U KANSAS LAW REVIEW 1. 
29
 See also J. Pauwelyn The Limits of Litigation: ‘Americanization’ and Negotiation in Settlement of  
WTO Disputes  19 OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 121 (2003-04) and C. BARFIELD, 
FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WTO (AEI Press, Washington, 
2001) at 111-131. 
 11 
by others, viz trained legal clerks, usually recent law graduates who are in the direct 
employ of individual judges for that purpose.  Thus by analogy, trial judges should be 
able to implement independent fact finding specialists to compliment litigants’ 
disclosure to the extent that it is incomplete or not credible.  Surely it is preferential 
for judges to ascertain additional facts to illuminate their understanding of evidence 
presented at trial rather than rely solely upon extrapolation from facts already in their 
possession, which would exacerbate the already dangerously subjective doctrine of 
judicial notice.30 
Although we have seen above that the Appellate Body has taken a liberal view 
of the panel’s right to seek information, Appellate Body has also voiced concern as to 
the limits of that right:  “A panel is entitled to seek information and advice from 
experts and from any other relevant source it chooses … to help it to understand and 
evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to 
make a case for a complaining party.”31 The Appellate Body cautioned that questions 
directed to the parties do not “overstep the bounds of legitimate management or 
guidance of the proceedings … in the interest of efficiency and dispatch.”32 This may 
mean that panels’ questions should not relieve the complainant of its burden of 
establishing the inconsistency of the respondent’s measures33 but it is unlikely that it 
means the panel should not even identify gaps in the factual record that necessitate 
further investigation.  It seems most likely that the Appellate Body simply intended 
that the panel’s inquisitive role should operate within a reasonable limit.  Such a limit 
can be found in the principle of non ultra petita: a judge can only examine the claims 
that are put before it.  Although identifying factual deficiencies is a different matter 
                                                
30
 See Sward supra note 28.   
31
 AB Report Japan Agricultural Products WT/DS76/AB/R  ¶129 (10 Feb 1999). 
32
 Panel Report, Thailand – Anti Dumping Duties WT/DS122/R  ¶7.50 (5 October 2000). 
33
 Waincymer supra note 5 at 543. 
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from rectifying them through proactive investigation, this second action should be 
permissible provided that the investigation is apposite to the specific allegations made 
by the parties in their submissions.   Thus the more detailed an allegation, the more 
likely evidence will be sought relating to it.  It has been further suggested that the 
panel should either engage in fact finding or refuse to do so depending on whether the 
legal issue to which the facts apply is seen as central to the overall dispute.  
Accordingly, if a party concedes a particular fact, there is less need for the panel to 
make an independent inquiry into it and if a question remains unanswered even if a 
party chooses not to present any specific arguments for or against it, then it clearly 
remains open to the panel to investigate.34  Beyond these guiding principles, the 
nature of the directions given to the investigatory body and the use put to the 
information it gathers will depend on the circumstances of each case.   
Another key limitation on judicial fact finding is the need for impartiality in 
order to avoid an apprehension of bias.  Separation is required between fact gathering 
and decision making or else objectivity is threatened.  This is precisely the reason 
why missing information should be obtained by a third party at the behest of judges 
rather than by the judges themselves; the decision-makers are insulated from any 
potential taint that could be engendered during the investigative process such as 
closeness or sympathy to the individuals involved.  There is also a practical advantage 
in the separation of investigation from decision:  institutionalized fact finding would 
obviate problems such as the lack of time available to part-time panellists and their 
location outside the countries where the facts originate.35 Additional benefits and 
problems associated with a fact finding body within the WTO will now be considered. 
 
                                                
 
35
 Oesch supra note 2 at 57. 
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V.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A WTO FACT FINDING BODY 
The first clear justification for the existence of a fact finding body within the WTO is 
evident in instances of resource inequality between the parties to a dispute.  As 
suggested above, many developing nations cannot finance the collection of evidence 
to support their allegations and consequently could benefit from assistance from the 
WTO itself in this area.  Concern for the trading needs of developing countries is a 
central feature of the DSU, reflecting the recognition that trade disputes in such 
nations can have wide reaching effects where lives could be lost. 36  Such procedural 
inequality between parties to WTO disputes was acknowledged when the Appellate 
Body granted a developing nation the use of outside counsel because it could not 
afford permanent trade law experts.37  The redressing of asymmetrical resources 
through the intervention of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has also been 
recommended during the informal consultation stage. 38 Concern for procedural 
fairness reflects the public dimension of the WTO DSB which does not adjudicate 
private actions but rather disputes between sovereign states. 
 As noted in Section II, a significant problem of fact gathering by members has 
been that of non-cooperation from parties, on whose goodwill fact collection often 
depends.39  For example, in the recent softwood lumber dispute, The United States 
complained to a WTO panel that the International Trade Commission (USITC)’s 
efforts to gather information regarding softwood lumber subsidization were 
obstructed by Canadian producers.40 Such non-cooperation may well have been 
                                                
36
 Eg DSU Articles  4(10), 8.(10) and 12(11). 
37
 EC Bananas WT/DS27/AB/R (9 Sept 1997). 
38
 Pauwelyn Limits of Litigation supra note 29 at 134. Pauwelyn envisioned fact finding only at the 
consultation stage. 
39
 Oesch supra note 2 at 57. 
40
 Softwood Lumber Investigation supra note 1 ¶4.282.  For another recent example of alleged non- 
cooperation in fact gathering see Panel Report - US Countervailing Measures on Certain Products 
from the EC WT/DS212/RW ¶7.68 (17 August 2005). 
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avoided were neutral WTO agents conducting the investigation rather than those 
representing a foreign state.  This is because WTO agents would be seen as non-
biased and therefore non-threatening to the interests of that state. 
In a similar fashion, institutionalized fact finding would demonstrate the 
significance of the interests at stake to the parties, and possibly also to third parties in 
the case of amicus curiae briefs, as it would embody the WTO’s commitment to the 
factual integrity of the dispute settlement process, a concept that cannot be over-
valued as it is vital to the bestowing of legitimacy to WTO decisions.  This is not to 
suggest that fact finding conducted by domestic authorities like the USITC is 
inherently flawed or biased.  However a panel decision based on facts obtained by a 
neutral agency would have greater perceived validity than one based upon facts 
obtained by the parties themselves, even though those facts are subject to subsequent 
independent evaluation of the panel under the objective reasonableness standard.  This 
procedural weakness in the current system may be one explanation for Canada’s 
expression of disregard for the USITC’s fact finding methodology in the recent 
Softwood Lumber panel decision.  Canada might well not have declared its intention 
to appeal the panel’s ruling41 based as it was on the USITC’s submissions had this 
evidence been obtained by an arm of the WTO rather than by their opponents in the 
dispute.   
John Jackson has argued that augmented legitimacy of WTO panel decisions 
would assist with compliance.42 Speaking of fact finding in particular, Manley 
Hudson similarly wrote in 1937: 
                                                
41
 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release no. 216.  (15 
November 2005). 
42
 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO (Cambridge U Press, 2000) at 160.  Although some 
have noted that the WTO has been a success in terms of compliance eg C Carmody Remedies and 
Conformity under the WTO Agreement (2002) 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 307 at 
309, K. Leitner and S. Lester record a large number of requests for panels to decide whether 
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An international tribunal cannot ignore the possible usefulness of 
such procedure, not only for ensuring that results will be arrived at 
on the basis of the fullest possible information, but also for creating 
that support in public opinion which is the one sure sanction of its 
judgments.43 
  
 
Indeed, as M Bassiouni remarked, some fact finding missions are “designed to simply 
show [sic] responsiveness to public outcry in certain egregious situations.  In these 
cases they are more akin to public relations missions.”44  Thus the very presence of a 
WTO investigation team within a state’s territory might reduce tensions such that 
harsh retaliation through countervailing duties or other such measures would not be 
necessary.  It is unlikely that the investigators would be viewed as an intrusion given 
that they would represent the global community, be appointed by the Member states 
and would partially consist of their own nationals (as will be suggested in Section 
VII).  As the process of WTO adjudication itself can be key to restricting harmful 
trade practices prior to the issuance of a ruling, the gravitas of a fact finding mission 
authorized by the WTO would emphasize the need to modify trade practices and 
induce concessions between members before a formal sanction is imposed.  
Moreover, panel reliance on facts revealed by third party investigation allows a 
member state to accept compromise in a face-saving manner that would not be 
politically feasible were the panel’s ruling based on facts presented and unearthed 
exclusively by the opponents, or perhaps worse, by an agency appointed under its 
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own authority. This is the essence of the advantage to adjudication before a multi-
lateral dispute body like the WTO.   
  
 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST A WTO FACT FINDING BODY 
There are various other criticisms that could be directed at the notion of a dedicated 
fact finding body within the WTO and these will now be considered in turn.  Firstly, 
institutional fact finding at the WTO might be seen as unnecessary given the nature of 
the evidence with which the panels are confronted.  As most WTO disputes involve 
assessment of “measures” undertaken by Member governments, it is the text of the 
measure itself which normally composes the factual foundation of panel proceedings, 
which tend to consist primarily of legal argument regarding those measures, rather 
than evaluation of particular facts.45   While this statement may have been accurate at 
one time it is less apt today.  Increasingly complex questions such as the assessment 
of the threat of injury from subsidization necessitate the evaluation of facts such as 
export, price and production figures46 and this demands the assistance of investigators 
with some familiarity with the nature of the data with which they are confronted.  Fact 
gathering could also be crucial where the panel is required to make determinations of 
environmental exemptions47, or regarding financial services48 or intellectual 
property49 obligations, issues which are becoming more common at the WTO. 
Enhanced fact finding capability at the panel stage could frustrate the 
consultation process.  Consultations have been successful in achieving pre-panel 
settlement in part because of their open atmosphere and confidentiality.  
                                                
45
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Consequently, concern has been expressed that increased formality at the consultation 
stage, such as pressure for full factual disclosure, could diminish that forum’s ability 
to facilitate settlement.50  Emphasizing the importance of the lessened evidentiary 
rigor in the consultation phase of WTO dispute settlement, Gary Horlick and Glenn 
Butterton commented emphatically: “[the] ideal degree of disclosure by the parties 
…seem[s] to be at odds with the spirit, if not the letter, of the WTO resolution 
process.”51 The Appellate Body disagrees, stating that all parties should fully disclose 
the facts on which their claims are based from the point of consultation onwards.52  
Despite this latter direction, it is advisable that in order to retain the potential for 
resolution derived from the more relaxed consultation stage, the fact finding agency 
should only be available once a formal panel proceeding has begun. 
 Maintaining a fact finding agency and conducting prolonged investigation 
throughout the world could be expensive.  John Jackson has warned that “a serious 
and prolonged fact-type hearing could easily bankrupt the resource allocation to the 
WTO dispute settlement system.”53  In contrast, James Bacchus has observed that the 
WTO’s budget is already small in global terms –  only US$80M annually,54 and 
therefore additional costs resulting from fact finding would hardly justify abandoning 
the project.  Availability of an improved evidentiary record would assist in identifying 
and correcting benefit impairments under the WTO agreements, and the resulting 
maximization in world trade would compensate for the cost of financing the fact 
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finding body born by individual members (as reflected in their contributions to the 
WTO). 
Expanded fact finding powers of the WTO DSB might be perceived by 
members as a further threat to sovereignty as guaranteed under Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter in that such powers could interfere in sensitive areas of domestic jurisdiction.   
A stricter standard of review of factual determinations by member states, such as 
correctness rather than objective assessment would be intrusive enough55 without the 
further probing that would be associated with de novo fact finding.  However, this 
view is not compelling because WTO members have already surrendered a degree of 
sovereignty by virtue of their consent to membership in the WTO.  It is difficult to 
imagine that fact finding within a member nation’s borders would further exacerbate 
the concern for sovereignty because the conducting of investigations seems to be less 
an aspect of self-government and therefore less intrusive than submitting to sanction 
at the hands of the DSB –albeit that DSB conclusions merely have the status of 
recommendations.  Fact finding by its nature concerns process – such as in the 
maintaining of complete, accurate and accessible records - and accordingly does not 
directly challenge substantive issues of policy or the purpose behind government 
programs, such as the promotion of a particular industry or sector of the economy and 
therefore any intercession into sovereignty is more symbolic than actual.  Any 
perceived sacrifice of a member’s autonomy would also be mitigated by that the fact 
finding was done fairly and without bias against particular member states.  This could 
be achieved by member states playing a strong role in the establishment and 
composition of the body itself, as discussed in the next section. 
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There may be concern that expanded fact finding powers for the WTO might 
reduce parties’ willingness to provide the requisite information under Article 13.1 and 
thus paradoxically lead to less information.   Rather than suffer the cost burden of 
conducting its own investigations, a party might be motivated to let the fact finding 
body obtain the information.  This would be permissible in the case of a developing 
nation unable to afford its own investigation, but not as a less-expensive alternative to 
a member state that could have obtained the information on its own.  However this 
eventuality is unlikely.  Despite the foregoing suggestion that sovereignty would not 
be threatened by fact finding, members it is safe to assume that members would still 
prefer to conduct their own investigations both for purposes of confidentiality and 
also because of their perception that fact finding by its own domestic agencies would 
tend to yield information that was more favorable to the member’s own case.   
Fact finding at the WTO could arguably be left for arbitration as provided for 
under Article 25 of the DSU.  However, as Pauwelyn has observed, the arbitration 
route is unlikely to be used with any frequency because of the multi-lateral nature of 
trade disputes and also because there is no appeal mechanism.56 The important feature 
of appeal is one of the reasons that member states are placing increased reliance on 
the WTO DSB to handle a wide range of trade related disputes.  The fact-finding 
power should be inserted into this mechanism for maximum efficiency leaving the 
successful less-formal arbitration stage intact. 
One might contend that any benefits derived from WTO fact finding could be 
achieved through ad hoc investigation, similar to how most expert advice is currently 
sought by the WTO.  The first problem with this is that the use of temporary agencies 
would not convey the aforementioned symbolic importance that a standing body 
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would.  Secondly, ad hoc fact finding bodies, such as those that have been used by the 
UN Security Council involving human rights violations, have been criticised for their 
lack of organisation which inhibits their objectivity and effectiveness.57 Efficiency 
engendered by standardization could be achieved by a standing body of investigators 
with an established procedure for finding, documenting and reporting.  Still, rather 
than create its own investigative agency, it might be more prudent for the WTO to 
make use of a fact finding body of another organisation, such as one commissioned by 
the UN Security Council, which might arguably achieve the same demonstrative 
legitimacy of a dedicated WTO panel with less expense.  Of course the Security 
Council’s mandate only permits it to take action if there is a threat to the peace58 
which would not normally be relevant to trade issues.59 The primary problem here is 
that an ad hoc body or one belonging to another international organization such as the 
UN might not have the requisite expertise in trade related matters.  It is conceivable 
that the WTO’s standing investigatory agency could be shared by the IMF or possibly 
by the UN Security Council, when evaluating the latter organization’s need to resort 
to economic sanction.60  
 
 
VII.   THE WTO BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
The form that the WTO fact finding agency would take, which has been mentioned in 
brief throughout this article, will now be reviewed and discussed. The best model for 
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the WTO investigative body would consist of a team of individuals appointed equally 
by and representative of WTO member states to avoid the apprehension of bias.  
WTO investigators would possess qualifications necessary to find and collect 
economic and other trade related data.  While they would not need to be qualified to 
the level of experts, relevant backgrounds in forensic accounting, law or economics 
would be preferable.  Document review paralegals also known as Project Lawyers, 
which are used with increasing frequency by large law firms to assist with 
documentary discovery requirements in complex files would be suitable candidates 
for this role because of their attention to detail and familiarity with locating key 
evidence among massive quantities of documentation.  Individuals with police 
training would be helpful to deal with recalcitrant individuals who may obstruct the 
fact gathering process and also to conduct on site inspections, perhaps of factories, 
warehouses or other industrial plants.  Such investigation would be particularly 
relevant to issues of dumping and subsidization. The need for police-type powers 
(which may involve searching private premises) demonstrate the public character of 
WTO dispute settlement which affects the rights of all citizens, not just the private 
concerns of the industries involved.  Investigators would not consist of government 
employees because this might increase the likelihood of a conflict of interest with 
respect to the state which appointed them particularly were an agent to engage in fact 
finding within his own state. As WTO investigators’ mandate would be at the behest 
of the parties and the panel judges (in keeping with the consent based nature of 
international dispute settlement), their activities would not be covert.  Such a mandate 
might undermine the legitimacy of WTO DSB decisions and ultimately hinder 
compliance.  WTO investigators would not be spies and as such FBI agents would be 
reasonable model.   
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 To avoid the problems associated with the ad hoc fact finding missions of the 
UN, the WTO investigative team would operate under an established code of 
procedure that outlines the extent of their powers and duties.  The first clear rule must 
be that the investigators would not offer conclusions but simply find and present the 
facts to the panel as revealed, enabling judges to arrive upon their own conclusions.  
Secondly, it would be important for each WTO member state to grant investigators 
the same authority that domestic law enforcement would possess, particularly since 
most WTO disputes involve to a large degree the trading activities of private entities 
rather than government bodies.  Domestic constitutional oversight over the exercise of 
these powers would ensure that rights were not infringed during fact finding and also 
minimize encroachment upon members’ sovereignty in the field of civil rights.  
Thirdly, procedure must be established for the format and timing for presentation of 
the agency’s evidence to the WTO panels.  Given the fairly strict chronology of the 
dispute settlement framework, additional time should be allocated to facilitate the 
investigator’s role in proceedings at the panel stage.  The panel has stated that parties 
should wait until the first written submission before they make a request to the panel 
to seek information, which would accord the panel sufficient time to ascertain the 
nature of the additional data that might need to be obtained.61 Accordingly, the 
investigatory body should not be deployed until after the first submissions.  Unlike the 
current regime, the investigatory body would be under an obligation to disclose any 
information gathered to the member state from which it is obtained.  The member 
state would then have the opportunity to modify its stance or rectify its trade practices 
without need for a panel ruling which would foster settlement.  This “sharing of 
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information” would also contribute to the image of the investigatory body as one of 
collaboration and assistance which would in turn engender cooperation.   
  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Although the agreements which constituted the WTO DSU contemplate the 
production of new evidence to the panels upon request of the parties, the organization 
currently has no de novo fact finding mandate on its own motion.  But as such a 
function is not unknown to international dispute settlement, it may be extended to 
WTO panels. This article has accordingly proposed the establishment of a standing 
fact finding body within the WTO to seek information to rectify omissions in the 
evidence submitted by parties. This function is in keeping with the inquisitive model 
of international tribunals which emphasizes negotiation. Caution must be exercised 
that the WTO’s fact finding power is not taken too far.  Accordingly the panel must 
not use evidence obtained from the investigators to make a party’s case for them and 
any information sought must relate to specific allegations from the parties. As it 
would not reach its own conclusions or make recommendations, the fact finding 
agency would not compromise essential judicial impartiality. 
 Institutionalized fact finding would enhance the WTO’s ability to resolve 
international trade disputes, most notably by neutralizing the disadvantage to 
developing nations and by increasing the legitimacy of decisions, ultimately leading 
to better compliance.  In addition to these practical advantages, it seems impossible to 
argue that it is not always preferable for an adjudicating body to have an optimal 
knowledge of the facts before them.  The more complete the evidence, the closer the 
proximity to the truth and therefore the stronger likelihood that justice will be done 
when the law is applied.  This is the essential goal of institutionalized decision-
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making and one of the primary reasons why sovereign parties choose to place their 
trust in international tribunals.  Failure to establish as complete an evidentiary record 
as reasonably possible through the assistance of a fact finding body would therefore 
undermine the credibility of the WTO as an organization that seeks to promote 
judicious resolution of international disputes.   
   
